Studies frequently quantify the economic impacts of invasive alien species (IAS) by estimating their management and damage costs. Despite uncertainties in the cost estimation process, the resulting figures potentially allow managers to weigh species' relative impacts. However, IAS economic cost estimates are not the only factors that determine which species receive management priority, as evidenced by prominent eradication programmes in the UK and by the British Environment Agency's (EA's) 2006 list of target IAS. This literature review investigates British IAS cases to determine whether policy-makers utilize economic cost figures when prioritizing species for management. We focus specifically on the EA's ten priority IAS and consider whether the exclusion of other prominent British IAS from the EA's 'most wanted' list relates to their estimated costs. Comparing the various cases underscores the importance of cost estimation and also highlights three other factors that feature prominently in IAS prioritization: threat to biodiversity, IAS distribution and management feasibility. Certain costly IAS do not currently receive national management attention (e.g. the pondweeds Elodea spp.) because they are either too widespread or too difficult to manage in a coordinated, national campaign. In comparison, the EA quickly prioritized the new arrival Ludwigia grandiflora (water primrose) for management because of its high potential costs, limited dispersal and feasibility of eradication.
Introduction
Invasive alien species (IAS) impact both the natural environment and human economic activities, often in unforeseen ways [1] . Quantifying varied effects and accurately assessing species' relative impacts can be difficult, if not impossible. Various studies have focused on estimating IAS financial costs [2] [3] [4] [5] , typically management costs and monetary damages, as proxies for underlying economic impacts. Although these financial cost estimates typically fail to capture the total economic value (TEV) affected by IAS, including many IAS environmental and ecological impacts [6] , the figures serve to underscore the severity of species invasions. The Pimentel et al. [4] estimate for the combined financial costs of all nonindigenous species in the USA, $137 billion/year, remains an oft-cited justification for management policies and for IAS research generally (cited 1 763 times on Google
Scholar as of 3 May 2011). Similar figures now exist
for Canada [7] , Europe [8] , Germany [9] , China [10] and the Great Britain [11] . These general cost figures (sensu Lovell et al. [12] ) clearly influence public attitudes towards IAS management, but the role IAS cost figures perform in the actual management of individual species is less apparent.
In a strict sense, a species' economic cost equals the net decrease in TEV attributable to the species between the pre-and post-invaded states [1 3] . TEV potentially includes a wide array of economic values, including marketed outputs, ecosystem services and benefits (sensu Fisher and Turner [14] ) and environmental option and bequest values. However, non-use values are often accessible only through stated preference techniques [15] and frequently vary from person to person. Consequently, IAS impact studies focus primarily on observable effects to localities, particularly management costs and damages (e.g. [4] ), which provide a minimum estimate for IAS economic impacts. IAS management encompasses a broad set of actions, including species prevention, eradication, exclusion, containment, mitigation and adaptation [16] . Managers pay the cost of these actions when the unattended impacts of IAS would be worse. Damages most frequently concern capital repair and replacement costs, but may also include lost revenue attributable to species. Many of these costs are borne by private stakeholders who encounter nuisance species during their normal operations. Ideally, site managers choose to remove or control IAS through cost-benefit analysis (CBA), weighing an unattended species' impacts against the costs of remediation. Management costs form the cost side of CBA, and avoided damages generally represent the benefits (e.g. [1 7] ). However, necessity sometimes forces localities to manage nuisance species in a given time period, regardless of cost. For example, managers removed Dreissena polymorpha (zebra mussel) accumulations blocking water intakes in North America because the mussels threatened to halt power plant operations [3, 18, 1 9] . Unfortunately, the benefits of such actions are often temporary. Individual sites are often subject to IAS re-establishment when neighbouring populations re-invade cleared areas. In the long run, preventing IAS establishment is usually less costly than managing an established species [11, 20, 21] . Economies of scale generally make IAS management at the regional or national level more cost-effective than combating IAS at the site level. National managers are able to prevent IAS introduction [22] through quarantine programmes [23] and controlling the importation and sale of organisms [24, 25] . However, large-scale IAS prevention and control programmes are expensive, and national managers possess finite financial resources [22] .
Policy-makers frequently conduct risk assessments to determine which species will receive management priority [26, 27] . Specific economic costs, such as those associated with a proposed management programme [26] or species [28] , can inform the process of risk assessment. One would expect managers to target those species for which management is deemed most cost-effective, but few studies have surveyed this process [22] .
Great Britain
Island ecosystems are particularly susceptible to species invasions, but islands are also conducive to IAS management. Both IAS prevention and eradication efforts enjoy greater feasibility on islands where geographic barriers limit the movement of species [29] . Great Britain has a long history of IAS establishment [30, 31] , with many invaders arriving because of human economic activities [32] . Given this long experience dealing with IAS, Great Britain also has a history of proactive IAS management [33] [34] [35] , making the island nation a good candidate for a review of IAS decision-making.
IAS management occurs at several spatial scales in Great Britain, with the Environment Agency (EA) and the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) overseeing Britain-wide programmes and a variety of national and local entities managing IAS within their jurisdictions (e.g. Scottish National Heritage and the Broads Authority). Defra conducted a series of IAS strategy reviews over the past decade [25, 36, 37] , which suggested a need for greater IAS prevention and management coordination. To this end, the recently created Great Britain Non-native Species Secretariat (GB NNSS) now oversees many IAS management efforts, including both national and local projects.
Until recently, few efforts had formally documented the economic costs of British IAS. Manchester and Bullock [31] provided one of the first assessments, documenting both damages and management efforts for a variety of species. Many of these same species featured prominently in the subsequent report on British IAS produced by Defra [25] . Four studies have now investigated the impacts of agricultural pests, vertebrates, plants and freshwater invasive species in greater detail [38] [39] [40] [41] , providing estimates of the management costs and/or damages associated with those groups. However, no IAS general cost figure existed for Great Britain until Williams et al.
[11] surveyed all British IAS and calculated their combined financial costs to be £1.7 billion/year. Williams et al. [11] also provided a thorough overview of IAS economic impacts in Great Britain, detailing (Table 2 ) and the allocated budgets of current GB NNSS management projects (Table 3) . Less common, but also instructive, are estimates for the current level of Britain-wide control expenditures for certain species (Table 1) . Prior to the comprehensive assessment of IAS economic impacts undertaken by Williams et al. [11] , such figures provided the best numerical proxies for IAS economic impacts in Britain. The question is whether British managers actually considered these financial costs when targeting particular species.
Most policy papers are not explicit about whether IAS financial costs have influenced particular decisions, either as part of a CBA or informally. However, some insight can be gained from the case of Fallopia japonica (Japanese knotweed) in Great Britain. The Defra IAS overview report published in 2003 [25] estimated the Great Britainwide costs of managing several species, including knotweed ( Table 1) . The large knotweed figure, £1.56 billion, was calculated by scaling known control costs over the total riparian surface area that might require management. Defra [25] did not calculate F. japonica damages, although the report suggested that IAS economic damages in Britain are generally high. Consequently, the management cost figure for knotweed was not featured in a formal management CBA. However, the cost estimate has been cited as a maximum /eradication cost in the GB NNSS risk assessment for F. japonica [43] under the query:
how serious is the direct negative economic effect of the organism?' High management cost figures might tip CBA Matthew P. J. Oreska and David C. Aldridge 3 against management, but the knotweed figure appears to have had the opposite effect. Knotweed has not been eradicated from Britain, but Table 3 indicates that F. japonica remains a British management priority 8 years after the Defra [25] study. The oft-cited F. japonica management cost estimate apparently serves primarily to underscore the extent of the knotweed problem and hence the need for management.
The F. japonica example shows that financial costs can factor in IAS management decisions, but is the F. japonica example typical? Matching ex ante cost estimates with the ex post costs of managing different species provides some additional insights. The costs of management actions already undertaken (ex post costs) are relatively common in the literature (Table 2 ), but these costs could not have influenced the decisions from which they are derived.
Damage and management cost estimates calculated before management actions were taken (ex ante costs) might have played a role in decision-making. Not all ex ante cost estimates match with subsequent management efforts.
Some management efforts do not have identifiable ex ante cost estimates in the literature, and some proposed actions are not implemented. However, expected management costs were calculated and published prior to several prominent IAS management efforts in Great Britain [25, 44] .
Ex ante cost estimates existed prior to at least three of the prominent management cases in Table 2 , which are ranked according to the size of their ex post costs. These include actions against Hydrocotyle ranunculoides (floating pennywort) and Myocastor coypus (coypu). Defra [25] estimated that the Great Britain-wide cost of eradicating pennywort would be £200 000-700 000. £1 00 000 has now been spent removing H. ranunculoides from the River Soar and from the Grand Union Canal alone [45] . The decision to eradicate the coypu in East Anglia was informed by specific costs associated with the prior eradication attempt made from 1 962 to 1 965 [11] . The successful coypu eradication, which cost five times the amount expended in the 1960s, was undertaken despite concerns about its expense [17] . Calculating the coypu damages avoided by the eradication would further justify the effort ex post. Although they do not cite a specific Table 1 The EA's [42] Top ten most wanted foreign species', other species cited by Defra [25] , and factors related to their prioritization [25] , birds and fish [31] Crowds out native flora, causes skin irritation [42] Crowds out native flora, reduces light and dissolved oxygen for aquatic fauna [56] Biodiversity threat rank [11:Fig. 14 
.1] Control method
Crowds out native flora, out competes native plants for pollinators [42] Crowds and smothers other plants, deprives light and oxygen to the aquatic habitat [72] Competes with native fauna [81] ; transmits Paragonimus westermanii (lung fluke) [58] Figure 1 . The relative magnitude of management cost estimates produced by Defra [25] for the `ten most wanted foreign species' in Great Britain [42] and for other species listed by Defra [25] (in parentheses); the average cost is shown here for cases where Defra [25] offered an estimated cost range (descriptions of these costs are available in Table 1 ).
gudgeon) in England and Wales [47] . Despite the absence of cost estimates, the decisions to target these species reflect a qualitative understanding of the potential costsavings to be gained. A Defra/GB NNSS risk assessment for the latter species concluded that P. parva spread was very likely,' with potentially 'major' economic impacts [48] . Mink impacts on commercial fish and poultry stocks have long been recognized, but specific monetary figures for these damages are still needed [11] . A third example concerns Sciurus carolinensis (grey squirrel).
Squirrel damages to silviculture were calculated during the Anglesey eradication effort [25] , but these figures did not prompt the effort itself. The damages, which may total £10 million per forest rotation [25] , can be used to rationalize continued management focus. Based on these examples, one can infer that management efforts are often undertaken with potential damages in mind, even though those damages are not always calculated beforehand.
The EA [42] 'Top ten' list provides another avenue for inferring the role of costs in the IAS prioritization process.
The Defra report produced in 2003 [25] estimated management costs for many of the same species targeted by the EA 3 years later, and these estimates provide perhaps the best justification for the EA's ranking. The species with the highest estimated costs, F. japonica, received first mention, and another species with high estimated costs, Heracleum mantegazzianum (giant hogweed), was listed fourth (Figure 1 ). In general, however, the EA prioritized emerging threats with significant potential impacts. As apparent in Figure 1 , most of A clue to this process can be found in the Defra/GB NNSS risk assessment template, which helps managers determine which IAS pose significant threats. Factors considered on the template, in addition to economic impact, can be broadly grouped under IAS ecological threat, distribution/establishment and management feasibility (e.g. [43, [48] [49] [50] [51] ). The GB NNSS notes that these factors are considered in relation to the risks species pose and not in relation to specific management considerations [52] . However, they are worth discussing here because they help explain why species without economic impact estimates received management priority on the EA list. These factors are not entirely separate from economic cost; management feasibility, in particular, relates directly to IAS CBA. Rather these factors add dimensionality to species impact discussions and help explain why estimated costs alone might not provide sufficient perspective for http://www.cabi.org/cabreviews IAS managers. Table 1 
Ecological/Biodiversity Impacts IAS biodiversity impacts are often significant but difficult to quantify, either as a percentage of economic cost or through another metric. P. leniusculus transmits a fungus that kills the native Austropotamobius pallipes (whiteclawed crayfish) [53] , M. vison preys on Arvicola amphibius (water vole) [54] and S. carolinensis replaces Sciurus vulgaris (red squirrel) where both occur [55] . The terrestrial and riparian weeds tend to create monocultures, crowding out endemic species, and Impatiens glandulifera (Himalayan balsam) attracts potential pollinators away from native plants, thereby reducing their reproduction potential [42] . Floating IAS, such as H. ranunculoides, reduce light and dissolved oxygen in water bodies, smothering everything beneath them [56] . These effects sometimes prompt management intervention. 0. jamaicensis was targeted in Great Britain because it threatens Oxyura leucocephala (white-headed duck) through interbreeding, not because it causes particular economic damages [11] .
Determining whether H. ranunculoides presents a greater biodiversity threat than I. glandulifera, for example, cannot be done with absolute certainty, because the plants impact different species. However, Williams et al. [11] managed to rank British IAS by the number of respondents identifying a particular species as a biodiversity threat in their recent stakeholder survey ( Table 1 ).
The stakeholders cited I. glandulifera most frequently, followed by F. japonica. H. mantegazzianum, R. ponticum, Crassula helmsii (Australian swamp stonecrop), M. vison, Myriophyllum aquaticum (parrot feather) and Prunus laurocerasus (cherry laurel) completed the top eight.
H. ranunculoides and P. leniusculus were also cited.
E. sinensis and P. parva were not specifically mentioned as biodiversity threats, the former possibly because of its limited distribution and the latter perhaps because of largely successful reduction efforts [57] . Although this ranking was not available in 2006 when the EA listed its top ten IAS, the agency had a qualitative sense of which species caused severe biodiversity impacts from conducted risk assessments (e.g. [49, 50] ), hence the inclusion of P. leniusculus and E. sinensis.
Distribution and Establishment
Nascent invasions are often ignored until they become widespread, at which point eradication is often unfeasible, and control costs have risen exponentially [11] . The case of the aquatic weed Ludwigia spp. (water primrose) represents an exception, a nascent invasion that received management priority over many of the species on the EA [42] list. The Great Britain Non-native Species Programme Board undertook aggressive action after discovering Ludwigia grandiflora at several locations along the south coast of England [11] and is now targeting Ludwigia peploides (creeping water primrose) as well. Although L grandiflora had not yet reached densities to cause particular problems in 2006, knowledge of the plant's tendency to choke water bodies, and of resulting control expenditures in France, justified swift action [37] . Defra spent £10000 in 2006 to research removal options [37] , and management is now ongoing. According to Williams et al. [11] , the current costs of control at 13 sites are estimated to be £24457 per annum. Williams et al. [11] calculated that eradicating Ludwigia spp. could cost £241 907 556 if the species were to become widespread in Britain, but it is important to note that managers in Britain identified L. grandiflora as a priority prior to determination of its ex ante financial costs.
The priority species E. sinensis and P. parva also have limited distributions in Great Britain, making them attractive targets for eradication even absent a precise understanding of their economic costs. EA decisions to target specific P. parva populations were based in part on the risk of those populations spreading [47] . So far, no coordinated effort has been made to eliminate E. sinensis, although individual removal has been proposed [58] .
A lack of appreciable economic costs likely explains why E. sinensis is not currently managed (Table 3 ).
In comparison, certain costly but widespread and established species were not among those targeted by the EA [42] . D. polymorpha, a widespread invader in England and Wales with a long history of establishment, threatens both municipal water suppliers and boaters. The mussels invaded Britain via Europe from the Caspian region as early as the 1820s [59] , and many British managers take their presence for granted. Nevertheless, the mussels' intake and hull-fouling effects necessitate costly remediation at many British water treatment works and boat yards [41] . A London-area water treatment facility spent upwards of £400 000 in 1997 to remove mussels from their culverts [60] . In addition to necessitating control expenditures, D. polymorpha also decreases industrial output. Mussel fouling of intake pipes reduces pumping efficiency and contributes to increased energy use. Costs to boat owners are typically small, but mussel removal from boat hulls averages approximately £250 per cleaning [61] . The related Elodea nuttallii (Nuttall's pondweed) is rapidly replacing and hybridizing with E. canadensis [61, 64] .
Control of both species is largely limited to timeconsuming mechanical harvesting and removal. Even though their average annual locality costs are moderate, the total cost of controlling pondweed in Great Britain is high on account of the species' spread [41] . Given the extent of the invasion, it is unlikely that a coordinated national campaign could control Elodea spp. cost effectively. Nevertheless, Vernon and Hamilton [65] suggest a national surveying effort to determine whether coordinated action should be taken.
Management Feasibility
Particular strategies best control different species, and some are more conducive to management at the national scale than others. A highly cost-effective scenario would require few management resources and have a high probability of success. Many of the EA [42] target species are controlled with chemical spraying (Table 1) , a relatively inexpensive approach [66] . Dichlobenil treats submerged vegetation [67] , and glyphosate treats terrestrial weeds and emergent aquatics such as C. helmsii [68] . Some chemicals effectively control aquatic animals as well, so long as the animals cannot escape the control area.
Pyrethrins have been applied to control P. leniusculus [66] , and the EA began applying rotenone in confined lakes to eliminate P. parva [47] around the time the 'most wanted' list was released [69] . Unfortunately, chemical control is not always successful or feasible. Chemical application in moving water dilutes the effect, and diquat, which controlled H. ranunculoides [70] , was recently banned in Britain.
Mechanical control and/or individual removal are often the best alternatives to chemical control, but both can be labour-intensive [71] . In addition, mechanical removal is not always advisable for plants. Cutting and harvesting the aquatic weeds C. helmsii, H. ranunculoides and Lagarosiphon major (curly waterweed) occasionally results in their unintended spreading downstream [61, 68, 72] . Eradicating some animal IAS can be done via individual removal over a sustained period [73] . This is feasible for large animals such as M. vison, O. jamaicensis and M. coypus, but less so for small animals such as Anoplophora glabripennis (Asian longhorned beetle) and Harmonia axyridis (harlequin ladybird). No insects were included on the EA [42] list. Other control alternatives that may work in specific situations include draining and shading water bodies and biocontrol. Grass carp are occasionally proposed for controlling aquatic weeds [72] , and the weevil Stenopelmus rufinasus appears to control A. filiculoides [74, 75] .
Given the many considerations associated with management feasibility, different species may be targeted under different conditions and at different scales. Many plant management programmes remain predominantly local in scope, such as those for H. ranunculoides (e.g. [45, 76, 77] ), because dense plant accumulations are best controlled by mechanical and manual removal. In comparison, Scotland is currently scaling up its M. vison eradication efforts [78] , because the programme benefits Matthew P. J. Oreska and David C. Aldridge 9 from geographic economies of scale. Unfortunately, efforts at both local and national levels can be expensive. The S. carolinensis eradication effort in Anglesey has cost more than the P. parva reduction efforts in England and Wales to date (Table 2 ).
Conclusions
As evidenced by IAS cases in Great Britain, managers consider a variety of factors when allocating management effort and resources. No single algorithm or metric currently determines IAS prioritization in Great Britain, given the complexities inherent to species invasions and constraints on managers. Estimated IAS economic costs could provide a fairly uniform metric for comparing IAS impacts across time and space, provided those cost figures are generated in a standardized way and relate comparable expenses. Williams et al. [11] provide many such figures for British IAS, but the literature has yet to reflect the contribution these figures will have on management decision-making. Older estimates for IAS management costs and damages potentially allow managers to compare species' effects and to perform management CBA. However, there is little evidence that older figures in the literature have been used in such a formal capacity. In fact, the case of F. japonica suggests that financial costs, including management costs, are more often invoked informally as a proxy for species' negative impacts. A high management cost estimate marks F. japonica as a large nuisance. Japanese knotweed's placement at the top of the EA's 'most wanted' list shows that management priority sometimes goes to these prominent pests.
Other cases show that British managers do endeavour to prioritize those species deemed most cost-effective for management. Given a lack of cost estimates for many species, evaluating this cost-effectiveness in Great Britain has been a largely qualitative process. Ideally, the top IAS priority for management would be an easily controlled species with a still limited distribution, a high ecological impact and high estimated economic costs if left unchecked. This type includes Ludwigia spp., which is now being managed in Britain accordingly. Species with lower impacts will obviously receive lower management priority, like E. sinensis. More difficult, however, are those cases where damages appear reasonably high, but the species is widespread and difficult to control, such as Elodea spp. in Britain. A national effort to control pondweed would likely tax management resources with little or no net benefit. Consequently, many such species continue to be managed by individual localities on a case-by-case basis.
